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DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT ZONES. MIGRATION CRISIS, LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES

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Jakub Stępień

Conference committee:

Professor Adam JELONEK (IMFES UJ), general chair

Professor Paul JACKSON (IDD UOB), program chair

Assistant professor Jakub STĘPIEŃ (The PRTs research consortium), communication
and coordination chair

Conference office support

Magdalena Pycińska, PhD

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Contact:

Jakub.p.stepien@gmail.com



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PANEL I THINKING ABOUT PRTS AND RESILIENCE AT THE SECURITY- DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

Panel's chair: **Professor Florian P. KÜHN**

Institute for International Politics

Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg

Helmut-Schmidt-Universität/Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

Florian Kühn is Senior Researcher and Lecturer at Hamburg's Helmut Schmidt University. He works on epistemological underpinnings of political concepts such as peace, security, or risk, and has written extensively on these topics with a special focus on South and Central Asia. His most recent book is on *Risk Policy* (Springer 2017), and he is working on a philosophical-methodological guide on *Ambiguity and Peace*. He is co-editor of the *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* and has published in *International Relations*, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, *International Peacekeeping*, *Third World Quarterly*, *Peacebuilding*, among others.

PANEL I - HOW TO STRENGTHEN RESILIENCE IN FRAGILE STATES: TAKING STOCK OF THE LITERATURE

Author: **Assistant Professor Benjamin ZYLA**

School of International Development & Global Studies

University of Ottawa

Over the past two decades, there has been vast discussion on the concept of resilience, particularly in the context of developing countries and fragile states. The abundance of resilience literature has appeared to emerge in response to fragility-inducing factors, such as natural disasters, economic crises and political instability. As Seville (2008: 1) reminds us, resilience has become 'the new black' as it continues to crop up in a wide-range of discussions across the literature. Even the UNDP's (2012, p. 1) logo states "Empowered Lives. Resilient Nations". However, despite the frequency in which it is referenced, there appears to be no formal consensus on how such a term can and should be used. Drawing on disaster management, security studies and international relations, Rogers (2015, p. 55) writes that there is still much debate circulating about where resilience came from, what it means, what it looks like and how it can be used. Thus, based on the relative newness of this field of study, this paper takes stock of the current state of the resilience research program. It thus responds to the OECD's analysis the transition from fragility to resilience is an under-researched area. In order to fill this gap, the paper focuses on (a) how resilience is defined; (b) how the literature determines and measures resilience; (c) what (policy) prescriptions are suggested to make societies resilient (or not).

Benjamin Zyla is assistant professor in the School of International Development & Global Studies at the University of Ottawa, he is co-organizer of the Fragile States Network (FSRN) at the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS), as well as Senior Fellow at the Austrian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society (TSAS). His research and reaching...



... interests include the security-development nexus, humanitarian intervention, peace-and statebuilding, global governance, and research methods. His latest book is *Sharing the Burden? NATO and its Second-tier powers* (Toronto: Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015). More information's are available at www.benjaminzyla.com

PANEL I - MAPPING THE [ONTOLOGICAL] SPACE OF PRTS IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE SECURITY DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

Co-Author: **Assistant Professor Benjamin ZYLA**

**School of International Development & Global Studies
University of Ottawa**

Co-Author: **Lecturer Jennifer Baechler**

**Rowe School of Business
Dalhousie University**

PRTs have played a major role in the toolset of the international community to bring peace, order, and development to fragile states like Afghanistan, and to counter a wide-spread destabilisation of the country more generally. One way to think about PRTs is to consider them as the practical integration of civilian and military responses to state fragility-- that is the security development nexus at work. PRTs are indeed designed to work where there is a need for a transitional arrangement from conflict to reconstruction.

As the military operations have been reduced to mere training missions, this is a good moment to take stock and reflect on the PRT experiences in Afghanistan. Indeed, both the security-development nexus as well as PRTs in particular do have agency; they are not static and have been evolving as time moved along. They are also multidimensional suggesting that there indeed is a network of connections in terms of idea, processes, objectives etc. as well as policies and practices.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the PRT experience in Afghanistan from a number of these lenses. What are, for example, some of the PRT's not stated outcomes for (a) the countries furnishing the PRTs, and (b) the countries that it deployed to? Can we say that they were a success (or not), and if so, how would one measure success? Even if one agrees with the sceptics that PRTs didn't accomplish what they were set out to accomplish on the ground, there is an argument to be advanced that the PRT experience amplified the development of WoG individual capabilities across the respective governments.

Jennifer Baechler is the Associate Director of the Corporate Residency MBA program and a Lecturer for the Rowe School of Business at Dalhousie University. She holds an MA in Peace and Conflict Studies from the European University Centre for Peace Studies and an Interdisciplinary PhD from Dalhousie University. Her research integrates the fields of public administration, political science, international development studies and peace/conflict studies and examines the operationalizing of cross-boundary collaboration (whole-of-government) within the context of international stabilization and peacebuilding efforts.



PANEL I – RESILIENCE AND PRACTICE: WHAT DO WE DO WHEN RESILIENT SOCIETIES ARE REQUIRED?

Author: **Professor Florian P. KÜHN**

Institute for International Politics

Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg

Helmut-Schmidt-Universität/Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

‘Resilience’ has quickly risen to prominence in international security and development circles. In recent years it has found its way into political discourse on state building and state fragility, triggering a vast but often conceptually indistinct examination of the subject. Given its meaning in policy publications and guidelines, ‘resilience’ tends to eschew a static conceptualisation of statehood, turning instead to a more dynamic, complex and process-oriented rendering of state–society relations. This illustrates a conceptual shift from ‘failed states’ to ‘fragile states and situations’. It also transforms the concept of ‘failed state’ as a mere threat perception – with ‘stability’ as its logical other – into ‘fragility’ as a particular form of social and political risk.

This paper analyses the concepts in 43 policy papers, focusing on the nexus of ‘resilience’ and ‘fragility’ in international state building, and assesses potential consequences. What does ‘resilience’ – as the opposite vision to ‘fragility’ – in fact mean? What is the practice derived from this chimerical state of states? How does the policy of strengthening resilience relate to neglect of humanitarian needs?

PANEL II DILEMMAS OF DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN A CONFLICT ZONE

Panel’s chair: **Professor Paul JACKSON**

International Development Department

University of Birmingham

Paul Jackson is a political economist working predominantly on conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. A core area of interest is decentralisation and governance and it was his extensive experience in Sierra Leone immediately following the war that led him into the area of conflict analysis and security sector reform. He was Director of the GFN-SSR and is currently an advisor to the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre which engages him in wide ranging policy discussion with donor agencies engaged in these activities, including various European Governments, the EU, the UN and the World Bank as well as the UK Government. Professor Jackson also works in several overseas locations for institutions ranging from the World Bank to local civil society organisations. These include Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Iraq, Bhutan, India, China and Nepal, amongst others. He is an experienced aid evaluator as well as governance and conflict analyst. He is author, co-author and editor of numerous monographs and papers, among which the newest one is *The Elgar Handbook of Security and Development*, Routledge (2015).



PANEL II – WHY WE DON'T LEARN FROM LESSONS?

Author: **Professor Carme ROURE I PUJOL**

Centre for International History
University of Barcelona
Universitat de Barcelona

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has faced new challenges triggered by globalization and a new context of wars, referred as asymmetric wars involving multiple actors from state and government players (government and multinational forces providing support for the established government) and non-state, non-government players (extremist groups, Taliban groups, tribal groups, local warlords, organised crime, etc.) fighting against the established government. It is the civilian population in the areas affected by these conflicts that suffer the heaviest consequences of these events.

Most of the countries suffering from these conflicts become weak or failed states. The definition is used when states are incapable of ensuring the basic needs and security of their own people. As a result, people and entire families become vulnerable as they cannot cover their basic needs (health, water and sanitation, food, education). Many become displaced within their own country or refugees in neighbouring countries; as they flee fighting, targeted attacks, killings, kidnappings, intimidation, etc. Alternatively, they can be fleeing from natural disasters, or situations of failed economies with no hope for change. In short, they are in search of security, and/or better economic and social conditions. Afghanistan is an example of a failed state.

During the Cold War, security policy and development policy were seen as separate missions. In the new post- Cold War world, we begin to see the development of the «peacebuilding» concept, where security, peace and development are seen as going hand-in-hand in the new international agenda. Innovative models were designed to address these new threats and to provide support for these weak or failed states; in an effort to assist them in recovering stability, consolidating peace, reconstructing, and developing the country or region. In Afghanistan, post 9/11, with the military intervention of the USA and the United Kingdom, we begin to witness these new models being developed that included new instruments such as counterinsurgency theory (COIN) of military doctrine and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). These integrated political, military and developmental mechanisms (including humanitarian assistance and the provision of essential services, as well as long-term programs for the development of infrastructure and capacity) all under one military command, and having the objective of stabilizing, reconstructing and developing the country. While, at the same time a large number of local and international actors in humanitarian relief and development (INGOs) were pursuing operational programs of their own.

This article, using Afghanistan as a case study, aims to show and discuss the dilemmas that humanitarian actors face when working in complex contexts (often confronted with a combination of factors: not only conflict activity, but also the effects of climate change, water shortages, demographic changes, or urbanization). Humanitarian actors face a multitude of challenges: Increases in the populations in serious need of assistance, finding



the resources to carry out humanitarian operations, violations of humanitarian principles and international humanitarian law and human rights covenants by both state and non-state actors.

Incorporating humanitarian and/or development and rehabilitation activities in the military and political strategies; such as the activities of development cooperation agencies and states participating in the mission of NATO/ISAF, integrated in different PRTs in Afghanistan; may endanger the activities and personnel of humanitarian and development organizations. Armed groups identify INGO personnel as part of the military, and therefore as legitimate targets. It is therefore important that these entities are clearly separated and differentiated, so that there is no doubt or confusion on the part of armed actors or civilian populations.

There is a paradox in pursuing “development” programming in the context of armed conflict. Objectives of development projects include durable and sustainable results, nearly impossible in the face of ongoing violence and destruction. Kofi Annan has said: “we can’t have development without security and security without development and respect for the human rights”. Experience shows that without stability, development programs are not possible.

Successful development programs require coordination between UN Agencies, International Organizations, NGOs, and donors; to improve assessment of problems, identify and prioritize needs, to avoid duplication of activities, ensure services for the most vulnerable, and for consensus (when possible) regarding methodologies of data collection, analysis and sharing.

Proper study and analysis of all aspects of the context, and of the culture of the beneficiary population, as well as their involvement in planning and implementing programming are required to ensure sustainable and effective development projects.

In Afghanistan after years of international community intervention, stability has not been achieved, violence continues and human rights continue to be elusive. PRT has not been proven feasible in a context of armed conflict; development and humanitarian relief is also dependant on foreign aid.

Methodology and sources: interviews, compilation of information from institutions, international organizations, ONG’s annual reports, thinks tanks, specific bibliography and the work field done in Afghanistan in 2012.

Carme Roure i Pujol has a PhD from the University of Barcelona (in a field of Contemporary History) with a Master in International Studies from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), and a degree in Humanities from the Open University of Catalonia (UOC). She has worked professionally in the field of humanitarian aid and in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Central America. She is author of Institut Català Internacional per la Pau (ICIP) Working Paper 2014/06 on *Spanish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Badghis (Afghanistan), 2005 -2013*. She researches on new models of intervention aimed at consolidating peace, reconstruction and development in failed states and in post-conflict situations.



PANEL II - 'OPEN DOOR' VERSUS 'BACK DOOR' POLICY. LESSONS FOR TURKEY IN THE SCOPE OF TERRORISM, MIGRATION AND BORDER SECURITY

Co-Author: **Assistant Professor Zeynep Ece ÜNSAL**

**Department of Political Science and International Relations
Istanbul Gelisim University
*İstanbul Gelişim Üniversitesi***

Co-Author: **Assistant Professor Ivica SIMONOVSKI**

***Co-Founder of Cyber Security, Corporate Security and Crisis
Management Initiative***

Terrorism is one of the important security issues in Turkey. For over the years the country had suffered from different types of terrorism. However especially from 2001, Turkey has become one of the main targets of the Middle East and religion oriented terrorist activities. The first ISIS attacked was done 2013 in Reyhanlı, a town near the Syrian border in Turkey, and the last one was on 21th August 2016 in Gaziantep, a city in South-East region of Turkey, in a wedding ceremony a suicide attack occurred and fifty-four people were killed. Between these attacks from 2013 to 2016 there has been more than ten suicide attacks even Ankara and Istanbul by IS terrorist organisation and both Turkish citizens and tourists were killed in these attacks. At the end of the all these political and security development in the region Turkey joined the last operation against the ISIS forces in Syria. On the other hand there is a reverse of the medal, the irregular migration flow from Syria towards Turkey, from 2011. Because of its geography, Turkey has always faced with the issue of migration, but the governments have never prepared against this phenomena. In history similar kind of irregular migration flows from Iran and Iraq occurred towards Turkey and the country produced an ad-hoc solution in 1990s. In October 2011 Turkey declared its “open door” policy for Syrian migrants, but actually according to Turkish legislations and international agreements, there is no “open door”. Broader explanation, according to Turkey’s geographical limitation on 1951 Geneva Convention and its protocols 1967, Turkey has accepted asylum seekers who are only “European oriented”. This means that Syrian migrants could not been accepted as asylum seekers according to Turkish laws and regulations. Passing through these legal problems, Turkey made another ad-hoc regulation in 2014 and gave these Syrian people to temporary protection status. This is the way of opening a “back door” for Syrian migrants without lifting to geographical limitation in Geneva Convention. When this article was written, there has been nearly 3 million Syrian migrants live in Turkey; some of them were staying in camps and the others expended different parts of the country. However there are some consequences of this “back door” for Syrian migrants. The first and main consequence is the security problems in borders of Turkey. According to the discourses of the Turkey’s government officials, there is no securitisation of migration, however there is a security problem because of the migration flows. Turkey’s open door policy opened the borders to both Syrian passport holders’ migrants and non-passports holders. The person who has no passport also could enter the country and accepted into country just a provision of registration. This registration process for a person, who has no passport or id, totally



depends on the declaration of that person's own. However the experiences showed us those terrorists, who were in a relation with terrorist organisation as PKK and ISIS, could easily pass the borders and made their attack, suicide attack or other kinds of attack against Turkey. The second security problem about opening border created a way for all kind of smuggling and money trafficking especially for supporting terrorist activities. Because of there is no obligation to live in camps where the Turkish State was prepared for Syrian migrants; some of criminals use the advantage of this open door policy and spread over the country, transit to Europe by illegally or join some criminal activities. This paper analyses the migration terrorism nexus in Turkey after Syrian civil war and Turkey's open door policy especially focusing on the border security. Although there is no securitisation about Syrian migrants in Turkey by the discourses of politicians, there is a serious terrorism-security problem in Turkey both for the country itself and Europe. Under this circumstances closing the door to these desperate people is not the true way of combatting terrorism and providing the security. However there are lessons that Turkey has to learn both controlling the humanitarian assistance for these migrants and providing security for its own territory, borders and neighbours.

Zeynep Ece Ünsal obtained PhD on International Security and Terrorism, in 2015, from Turkish Military Academy, Defence Sciences Institute. She is an Assistant Professor at Istanbul Gelisim University, Faculty of Economics Administrative and Social Sciences – Department of Political Science and International Relations from 2016 and part time lecturer at Başkent University Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences-Department of Political Science and International Relations from 2015. Her main research areas are: international security, terrorism, international organisations and European Union.

Ivica Simonovski, holds PhD in Political Science from 2011. He was Assistant Professor at Faculty of Security and Financial Control at MIT University, Macedonia between 2011-2016. Working for Ministry of Finance in Macedonia from 2008. Dr. Simonovski is Co-Founder of "Cyber Security, Corporate Security and Crisis Management Initiative" in Macedonia. He researches international politics, organised crime, terrorism, economic and financial and cyber crime.

PANEL II - UNRWA: EXPERIENCES ON THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN THE CONTEXT OF REFUGEE CRISIS

Author: **Assistant Professor Oscar MONTERDE MATEO**
Centre for International History
University of Barcelona
Universitat de Barcelona

UNRWA is one of the most long-established United Nations agencies, providing assistance and development opportunities for refugees. Specifically created to assist Palestinian refugees during the Arab-Israeli conflict, it has been defined as a post-colonial agency, an instrument of the international community to promote peace and security in Middle East through humanitarian action and development.



Almost seventy years after its establishment, the Agency has gained great experience in the security-development nexus. As many authors have pointed out, the history of UNRWA is a global history of aid and development interventions in the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. Up to the present days, UNRWA continues operating in a highly unstable conflict area where the refugee issue represents a greatest challenge in terms of humanitarian aid, development and regional security. Nowadays the UNRWA experience and know-how can be very helpful in developing new mechanisms of coordination of the international community based on the security-development nexus to cope with the Syrian refugee crisis.

The paper here presented tries to analyze the development experiences of UNRWA in relation to the promotion of peace and security in the Middle East, in order to draw conclusions for the present. The main objective of the paper is to examine some of the UNRWA experiences, from the beginnings until today, in order to understand the latest reforms of the Agency and in which way it faces the challenges in the new context of unrest in Middle East.

The UNRWA development experiences have been heterogeneous, from the efforts towards regional economic development or the latest human development interventions linked to urban development processes, to the numerous community development projects in contexts of high conflictuality, or peacekeeping and peacebuilding. UNRWA, as international organization, has adapted itself during the years to the changing landscape of Middle East, and it has developed the capability to quickly respond to the emergence of new needs and new conditions on the ground. Nevertheless, a permanent situation of financial crisis, the dependency from hosting States or from the occupier in the case of occupied Palestinian Territories, have strongly limited its capacity of effective action.

This paper looks deeply into some aspects of the research carried out for my PhD, presented last January, about the evolution of the UNRWA relief and social services programs, in which the evolution of the community development strategies adopted by the Agency in the occupied Palestinian Territories have been specifically analyzed. To define the research, a huge bibliography about the Organization and its relation with the evolution of global policies on development and security has been consulted. The sources of the research are the annual reports of the Organization, as well as other specific documents of the UN archives in Geneva and New York or the Agency archives in 'Amman. Furthermore, in order to better understand the present situation, some interviews have been added with personnel of the Agency and other international organizations acting in the present context of the refugee crisis. Other agencies' reports and researches about the socio-economic situation of Palestinian refugees in different UNRWA operation fields have been also consulted.

In the context of the current Middle East refugee crisis, UNRWA can prove to have great experience in the relation between development and security. In a certain way, we can affirm that the limitations of UNRWA represent the limitations of the international community itself in facing the crisis. However, its know-how can be helpful in the implementation of human development interventions on the ground. The last experiences in human development, focusing on community projects or on urbanization projects and improvement of living conditions, serve as an example of strategic interventions towards



refugees, which are not limited to setting up refugee camps but include actions designed for entire communities forced to displace and living under constant threats in a highly unstable and conflict-affected region.

The historical analysis of the Agency allows us to track the evolution of UNRWA interventions and to consider how the relation between development and security has come into being. From a comparative historical perspective, we can better understand the background, the lessons and the actions characterizing the current refugee crisis in Middle East.

Oscar Monterde Mateo is researcher at the Centre d'Estudis Històrics Internacionals at the University of Barcelona. He obtained PhD in History there with a thesis focuses on the study of the humanitarian impact on the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank and UNRWA's relief and social services programs. Member of the consolidated research group of the Generalitat de Catalunya, Grup de Recerca i Anàlisi del Món actual (GRANMA). He has been visiting researcher at the Center for Palestine Studies at Columbia University, at the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, and at the Institut Français du Proche Orient in Amman. He has directed some courses organized by CEHI, and has been professor assistant in Contemporary history at the University of Barcelona. Now coordinates a research project with the support of the International Catalan Institute for Peace, entitled, *Unprotected about the refugee crisis and armed conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan and Palestine*.

PANEL III PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Panel's chair: **Assistant Professor Jakub STĘPIEŃ**

***The European Experience of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in
Afghanistan research consortium***

Jakub Stępień holds a PhD in Political Science and MA in Religious Studies (Science of Religion). He was visiting fellow at the School of Government and Society at the University of Birmingham (2015). He served with ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) in 2011-2012 as a development aid advisor and Afghan civil administration specialist in PRT Ghazni. Dr. Stępień is initiator and coordinator of *The European Experience of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan* research consortium. His primary area of expertise includes development aid, (post)conflict reconstruction and radical groups and religious fundamentalism movements in South Asia. He gives specialised lectures and trainings on requests disseminating results of his research and experience i.a. had been invited to give a lecture at the Supreme Headquarter of Allied Powers in Europe on *The Structure of non-Western Ideology of Religious Fundamentalism and Its Impact on International Security and Global Level of Violence*. Additionally, he is skilled in public diplomacy, cultural differences and its impact on economy. He is initiator and co-author of the first Polish academic handbook on development aid (2010). He has published in *Journal of International Development* on development aid programme in Afghanistan's Ghazni province. His very last research monograph is on *Hindu Religious Fundamentalism* (2016).



PANEL III - THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NATO CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION: OPERATIONAL IDENTITY OF CIMIC

Author: **Research Assistant Agata MAZURKIEWICZ**

Institute of Political Science and International Relations

Jagiellonian University

Uniwersytet Jagielloński

There are many stories of two opposing, and sometimes even conflicting worlds mixing together. Among the fictional ones such as 'Avatar' or 'Pocahontas', one can also find the stories of the encounter of civilians and soldiers during peacekeeping missions. Indeed, those two actors often represent different mindsets, work styles and expectations. This realization became clear to the high echelons of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) during the military operations of the late 1990's. During those missions soldiers faced changed operational environment encompassing multiple types of civilians, and a new catalogue of responsibilities. This development led to the establishment of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), a military facilitator defined as the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors. CIMIC branch serves as a liaising factor between the civilian and military worlds. Thereby, in their everyday duties CIMIC officers combine two very different roles, creating an innovative operational identity, often distinct from traditional tasks and roles of soldiers.

The proposed paper will therefore focus on the question of how CIMIC officers perceive themselves in a non-permissive environment of a peacekeeping mission. In doing so, it will explore the kinds of roles performed by CIMIC officers and the emerging role tensions within CIMIC operational identity. This line of inquiry is especially relevant in discussing the performance of CIMIC officers, as the role tension negatively impacts the conduct of civil-military cooperation. Following Goffman, the role is hereby understood as the way in which the individual in ordinary work situations presents himself and his activity to others, and the way he manages the impression they form of him and expectations formed towards him. The dichotomy of roles performed by CIMIC operators consists of a *warrior* and a *peacekeeper*. The *warrior* role includes characteristics and activities traditionally ascribed to the role of the soldier and include rigour, obedience, readiness to engage in a fight, etc. The role of a *peacekeeper* is much closer to the profile of a civilian humanitarian worker, characterised with flexibility, open-mindedness, and creativity in solving problems. The operational identity of CIMIC officers is therefore constructed upon inconsistent and conflicting elements.

The research underlying the proposed paper is focused on NATO CIMIC due to a clear definition of civil-military cooperation provided by the organisation and the fact that it has already deployed a considerable number of CIMIC officers into peacekeeping operations. The data was collected through a series of semi-structured interviews with 23 officers experienced in performing tasks related to civil-military cooperation. Interviews were conducted in 2016 in two NATO-CIMIC centres: CIMIC Centre of Excellence in the Hague (the Netherlands) and Multinational CIMIC Group in Motta di Livenza (Italy). The outcomes of the research are supported with the analysis of the existing literature on military identity and role theory. The research was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland, within the



project entitled 'The influence of roles of civil-military cooperation officers on the effectiveness of their mission in peacekeeping'.

The proposed paper shows that the operational identity of CIMIC officers is based on a role tension. On the one hand, CIMIC officers declare a strong attachment to being a part of the military structure in the traditional sense. They identify themselves as soldiers (*warriors*), who are trained and socialised into the life in the armed forces. Their group affiliation is underlined by adherence to standard military procedures regarding uniforms and visual identification of buildings and vehicles. In this sense, CIMIC officers rarely perceive civil-military cooperation as a separate, distinctive branch. An important factor that contributes to this identification is the lack of CIMIC career path, which does not open high ranking positions for soldiers willing to dedicate their service to development of civil-military cooperation. Consequently, CIMIC officers usually assume this position for a short period, sometimes even limited to three years, after which they return to their original military branch.

On the other hand, CIMIC officers underline the uniqueness of the 'CIMIC mindset' and its distinctiveness from the traditional soldier's mentality. Their work in the mixed civil-military environment entails an open mind and readiness to accommodate different world views, which are not necessary in performing traditional military tasks. CIMIC officers are often required to distance themselves from the military style of communication and behaviour and instead assume a much more sensitive and receptive attitude. Furthermore, dealing with civilians often entails that CIMIC officers have to leave behind their weapon, which in every other case is an important element of their military identity. In this sense, CIMIC is closer to the domain of a *peacekeeper*.

The role tension in civil-military cooperation lies in the fact, that even when engaged in CIMIC, officers still declare a strong attachment to their traditional military role. Because of the structural constraints of the branch and the limited possibility for career development, CIMIC officers are not fully socialised into their role. Their awareness of the temporary character of employment in this position and limited perspectives for promotion do not encourage them to develop and sustain the *peacekeeper* part of their operational identity. Moreover, it propagates an opinion that CIMIC is in fact a 'freezer for soldiers and a pause in their career. In this sense, the role tension stems from structural limitations and has a negative impact on the performance of civil-military cooperation, as it obstructs the formation of a fully-fledged CIMIC identity and full accommodation of the CIMIC role.

Agata Mazurkiewicz holds MA in International Relations. Her research is focused on civil-military relations, peacekeeping missions and NATO. She was part of the international team working on conflicts in border regions and social coherence. Currently, she works on her PhD thesis titled: *Civil-military cooperation in changing theatre of operation*.

PANEL III - THE EVOLVING SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN IRAN. NEW TRENDS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Author: **Research Assistant Abdolrasool DIVSALLAR**
Department of Political Science
University of Tehran
Dāneshgāh-e Tehran



During the 19th century when Iranian intellectuals faced modernity and realized the importance of the idea of progress including freedom and constitution, ironically they mostly neglect the concept of order and especially political order. Although progress was seen more as a social freedom in the context of constitution, but in practice the lack of systematic relation between progress-order-freedom led to social unrest, political insecurity and violence and turned to one of the main reasons for failure of early Iranian intellectual attempts; since progressive initiatives assumed by the kings as destabilizing factor, social suppression intensified. The result was late-development and less freedom. In late 19th and early 20th century security and order addressed more seriously in Iranian political thought, in an attempt to bridge what thoughts to be the destabilizing effects of development. While the basic development needs and security concerns were simultaneously on the agenda of the new modern state in Iran during 1930-1950, gradually security takes an upper hand due to the country's growing political instability. The tendency to prioritize the security over development intensified during 1950-1979 which development was overshadowed by security concerns coupled with regional ambitions. Development enjoyed dedicated bureaucracy and intense planning in this era however security was still the distinguishing parameter which effects development goals and resources. This pattern continued throughout post 1979 revolution where security concerns remains the fundamental of policymaking in Iran. High Costs and series of challenges led by this approaches requires its revision. Meanwhile emergence of important cases after 90s in which development became the basis of security decisions opens new opportunities of a more balanced security-development nexus. In this new trend development gradually gains an equal weight as security and security-development cooperation's for common solutions begins.

In this sense the article's main question is that how these dynamics and continuations of various patterns of relations between security and development in Iran effects political stability and prevents insecurity? And what lessons could be learned from evolution of Iranian security-development nexus? Historical analysis coupled with policy analysis is used to find proper answer to the question. The author classifies security-development nexus in Iran in three main era that help explaining its evolution. The first era marked with ambiguity of relations, second era is distinguished by prioritization of security over development, and in final era signs of a balanced security-development nexus is emerging. Concepts, policies and implications in each era is analyzed.

Findings of the article shows that during the first era where ambiguity rules the relations of security and development and linkages between the two either in concept or policy aspect were ignored, Iran experienced the lowest political stability. The cases of instability caused of underdevelopment and security policies that hinders development were abundant. However in second era which improving security and improving regional power was considered the main foundation of development, various cases of security policies identified that ignored developmental considerations and also caused late development. This in long term led to more political insecurity and violence which 1979 revolution, social unrest in mid 90s and Atomic policies during 2005-2013 are classical examples. Prioritization of security over development although in short term satisfied Iranian policy makers however in longer term created developmental challenges that weaken their political stability. This effect perceived and led to emergence of Third era in which mutual effects of development and security considered strategically important. Responding to domestic security concerns



with developmental solutions, considering social security, and more pragmatic approach to improve synergy are main policies in this era which are still in infancy period. Iran's policy toward Kurdish minority, policy approach to drought in Lake Urmia, border control policy and JCPOA are examples for emergence of a new era. These policies were effective on reducing violence capacity and lead to more social and political stability. Non-violent measures or developmental measures to tackle security concerns improved political stability in a time when serious opposition against the regime existed.

Article concluded six lessons from the evolution of security-development nexus in Iran that were effective to control violence and improve political stability. 1) Officers new understanding that military measures is not effective to restore long term social stability 2) Officers conception of high resource coercion in securitized environment 3) New developmental roles and tasks given to military 4) Sticking to violent military-policing as a short term measure 5) Giving participatory roles to officers in development decision makings and 6) Detecting developmental policies with insecurity effects and restoring insecurity led by development policies via reforming policies. It's believed that the experience of Iran could give useful hints to tackle insecurity and decreasing the level of violence in Middle East and may replicate as a model for hot spots.

Abdolrasool Divsallar is PhD Candidate of Political Science specializing on Iranian Issues at University of Tehran. He is a visiting research fellow at Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies too. Mr Divsallar's research interests include security studies with the focus on Civil-Military relations in Iran and Russian military thought, and also development studies with the focus on theory of development, resource politics and info-politics in Iran.

PANEL III - POLITICAL RENT AND STATE BUILDING: THE CASE OF KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

Author: **Assistant Professor Łukasz FYDEREK**

Institute of Middle and Far Eastern Studies

Jagiellonian University

Uniwersytet Jagielloński

This article seeks to help develop a clearer understanding of the impact of oil rents on the process of state building. In order to assess the impact of oil rent on state building the case of Kurdistan Region of Iraq has been analysed. Two periods of a state building process in KRI has been assessed: 2005-2013 – the time when oil rent has been available and 2014-2016 – a period with no oil rent available.

There is a widely held believe, that oil rent is an enabling factor in the state building process. The Kurdistan Region in Iraq after 2003 has been considered as a successful case of post-conflict reconstruction. Contrary to other regions of Iraq, three provinces governed by the KRG have not been plagued by the eruption of political violence. Main political of the region actors have been committed to resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner. In that enabling environment state-like regional institutions have been constructed: representative parliament, elected presidency, police and quasi-army (the Peshmerga) as well as bureaucratic administration.



Literature review shows that the relative success of KRI has been attributed to a number of factors: strong nationalist identity among Iraqi Kurds, well established political parties (KDP and PUK), the period of incubation of the regional authorities during the last years of Saddam's regime (1991-2003), and the access to the oil rent. Recent economic and political crisis in Iraq brought significant changes in the environment of the KRI. After prolonged disputes over oil, in 2014 central government in Baghdad has stopped transferring the part of oil revenues that has been allocated to KRG since 2005. That created a new economic reality in the Region which, together with the other factors, has contributed to changing political dynamics. Hence the political trajectory of KRI in 2014-2016 may be seen as an interesting case of a post-conflict and rentier-based political system stripped of the oil rent. The political dynamics of KRI after 2014 – discussed in detail in the paper – has been highly influenced by the lack of oil rent. The unfinished process of state building of KRI has significantly slowed down in two recent years and political consensus among main political actors has terminated. Thus the initial findings of this paper seems to support the argument on viewing the political rent as an enabling factor of the process of state building.

Łukasz Fyderek obtained PhD in Political Science at the Jagiellonian University. He is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Middle and Far Eastern Studies of the Jagiellonian University. He specialises in Middle Eastern region, its international relations, authoritarian regimes, political system transformations and public management. He is co-author of the first Polish academic handbook on development aid (2010) too.

PANEL IV DEVELOPMENT ACTIONS AS A GAME CHANGER IN AN AFGHAN CONFLICT

Panel's chair: **Professor Antonio GIUSTOZZI**
Department of War Studies
King's College London

Antonio Giustozzi holds a PhD from the London School of Economics (International Relations) and a BA in Contemporary History from the University of Bologna. He worked at the Crisis States Research Centre (London School of Economics) until January 2011. He served with UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan) in 2003-4. Dr. Giustozzi regularly visits Afghanistan, where he carries out a number of projects. His area of expertise includes insurgencies, security sector and state-building and demobilisation. He works on the security dimension of failed states and states in a critical situation. He also researches the political aspects of insurgency and warlordism and states' response, as well as ethno-politics and the study of administration building in recovering states. He is author of numerous books, in recent years, he has mainly been working in and on Afghanistan. Dr. Giustozzi is editor of *Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field* (Columbia University Press, 2012); author of *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords of Afghanistan* (Columbia University Press, 2009) and *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The New-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007* (Columbia University Press, 2007); and co-author of *Negotiating with the Taliban: Toward a Solution for the Afghan Conflict* (Crisis States Research Centre working paper series 2, 2010).



PANEL IV – DIVERGENCE OF INTERESTS: DEVELOPMENT AID, COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND THE NEGOTIATION OF ACCESS TO TALIBAN-HELD AREAS IN AFGHANISTAN

Author: **Professor Antonio GIUSTOZZI**

**Department of War Studies
King's College London**

One of the big narratives of the Afghan conflict was that in the particular context of Afghanistan, where the armed opposition was viewed as an anti-modernist and ultra-conservative expression of the most backward sections of society, development was the most effective form of counter-insurgency. Hence once the Taliban insurgency started picking up in 2005, aid agencies were asked by their government to back up the counter-insurgency and stabilisation effort by concentrating most of their generous aid effort in the counter-insurgency priority areas, that is in most cases around the PRTs.

Did the Taliban share this view that development aid was a threat to them and their cause? How did they react to it? Despite some widely reported incidents, from 2002 onwards NGOs and humanitarian organisations have by and large been able to carry on their work with mostly only temporary and localised interruptions in areas of Afghanistan under the influence and the control of the Taliban. This also applies to many NGOs which were carrying out projects funded by the aid agencies of countries involved in the counter-insurgency effort and even NGOs receiving funds by the PRTs. When questioned about how this was possible, NGO managers would routinely reply that community elders lobbied or even forced the Taliban to allow NGO projects, which were beneficial to the local communities. Elders in communities affected also tend to highlight their role in allowing development aid and projects through.

The paper will discuss Taliban perceptions of development aid, their internal debates and the strategy they developed with 'manage' it. Within the Taliban there was a substantial consensus that whereas humanitarian aid was not a threat, development aid with its transformative potential was indeed a potential threat for the Taliban. The Taliban also acknowledged in interviews that local communities were in favour of receiving development aid. The real debate among the Taliban was about how to deal with this threat. Hardliners simply argued that development project should be attacked violently, but the political leadership of the Taliban realised that losing the support of local communities would do no good to the Taliban's. It then proceeded to set up a complex system to manage development aid and channel it through the boundaries of what the Taliban considered acceptable forms of development aid. Certain forms of transformative development, such as female empowerment, would be banned, while others, such as infrastructural development, would be welcomed. Key to the Taliban's system was the requirement that any organisation intending to deliver development aid to an area of Taliban operations would be required to register with the Taliban and transparently share with them details about its projects.

To what extent were the Taliban successful in forcing development organisation to work through their system? Certainly most development organisations, whether NGOs, contractors working for foreign development agencies, Afghan government departments, or UN agencies, engaged with the Taliban and either accepted the Taliban system, or tried



to negotiate with the Taliban deals to allow the delivery of development aid. The Taliban leadership struggled to impose discipline on this matter, with some hardliners breaking ranks from time to time and carrying out unauthorised attacks on development projects, and local Taliban often negotiating deals behind the back of their leaders, allowing projects which did not meet the Taliban leadership's criteria. On the whole, however, the Taliban managed to greatly reduce the negative impact of development aid as a tool of counter-insurgency, although not entirely so. Of note also the fact that development organisations did not by and large accept to operate within a counter-insurgency framework, and opted to find accommodation with the Taliban, contributing largely to the failure of the counter-insurgency-cum-development strategy.

The paper will be based on two research efforts carried out in 2011 and 2014 respectively. The first one involved 20 interviews with aid workers, 31 interviews with community elders, and 36 interviews with insurgents, including 6 cadres and 30 commanders. The second one involved 30 interviews with insurgents, including several tasked to deal with NGO and humanitarian access. Of these 30, 7 were high level cadres, 13 were provincial level cadres and 10 were tactical level commanders.

The interviews were mostly carried out by experienced Afghan researchers, who have been interviewing Taliban for years on a variety of issues, with a few being carried out by the author of the paper himself.

PANEL IV – THE LOGIC OF THE ALLOCATION OF DEVELOPMENT AID IN AFGHANISTAN ON A SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL UNTIL 2013. GHAZNI CASE. LIMITATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

Author: **Assistant Professor Jakub STĘPIEŃ**

The European Experience of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan research consortium

The process of allocation of development aid in Afghanistan is still under-researched. Although the general issues of development aid in/for Afghanistan seems to meet with a significant interest among researchers, the most popular perspective is clearly based on a national level. Only in selected cases it is supplemented by sub-national (regional or provincial) level analysis. Moreover, the interplay between security (and military objectives) and development goals and its consequences are still not sufficiently described and explained. Many questions concerning development aid in the region of Southern Afghanistan and Ghazni province in particular remains unanswered.

This paper analyses the way of allocation of development aid managed by Polish representatives in Ghazni province. Polish bilateral development aid program for Afghanistan was concentrated solely on Ghazni province in South Eastern part of Afghanistan, where a Polish part of a local Provincial Reconstruction Team was established in 2008 and continued its activities till 2013.

The paper tackles with the problem focusing on decision-making process on a sub-national level in the Ghazni province, its conditions, limitations and outcomes. Paper's author points out security conditions influencing the process and its actors, and explains its significance and rationale.



The Polish development aid (officially called 'development cooperation') is perceived as an integral part of international efforts to rebuild the war-torn country. Due to security level in the province international organisations activity (and international non-governmental organisations as well) was seriously restricted. The paper shows that security factors heavily influenced not only 'quick impact' development or rebuilding projects run by US troops (mainly the United States PRT Ghazni, and Agribusiness Development Team (ADT)) but a longer term development aid programmes too. Which were not well thought out itself in the then security situation as pointed out in author's previous paper *The Polish Development Programme for Ghazni province (Afghanistan)* in the Journal of International Development, (2015).

Finally, the paper provides an insight into an issue whether there was alternative routes to take for development sector decision makers and which ones (if any) could be considered practical in the then situation.

The paper is based on field research carried out in Ghazni in 2011 and 2012. The methodology used during research includes participant observations (assessment of the ongoing decision-making process), interviews with the Polish and the United States personnel (Polish and the United States PRT unit, ISAF military officers, the United States Texan Agribusiness Development Team unit), development aid project's documentation and remarks and other national and international institutions data's analysis (military and non-military as well).

PANEL IV – THE DEVELOPMENT-INSURGENCY NEXUS? AN ANALYSIS OF SOURCES OF INSURGENT FINANCING IN AFGHANISTAN

Co-Author: **Assistant Professor Péter MARTON**
Institute of International Studies
Corvinus University Budapest
Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem

Co-Author: **Assistant Professor Balázs SZENT-IVÁNYI**
Aston Centre for Europe
Aston University

The paper examines the role of development aid in the conflict economy of Afghanistan. Anecdotal evidence shows that at least some development aid is hijacked through various mechanisms by armed actors, including insurgents. The paper provides a comprehensive assessment of what we know about the financing of the insurgent factions in Afghanistan, with special regard to the Taliban and the role of foreign aid. Different sources in the literature attribute varying weight to the sources of financing for insurgent groups in Afghanistan, with participation in the narcotics trade, extortion against NGOs and entrepreneurs, and state sponsorship by Pakistan being among the most frequently cited ones.

The intention of the paper is to examine if any of these sources of funding can be seen as dominant in determining the level of insurgent activity, using pooled OLS regression analysis. Based on the insights from the literature on the funding of the insurgent groups in



Afghanistan, the paper derives proxies to operationalize and measure these determinants on a provincial level. These proxies include the cultivation of poppy and other narcotics (data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC), levels of foreign aid (based on geo-coded aid project level data from AidData), the World Bank's socio-economic indicators on Afghan provinces, as well as a number of other control variables. The dependent variable, the intensity of the insurgency, is measured by the number of combat deaths in each province.

Direct external sponsorship can also play a role in funding insurgent groups, but this is difficult to operationalize in quantitative analysis. It is expected that if the ability to secure external sponsorship plays an important or dominant role in the financing of the insurgency, then the various factions will not have a significant incentive to shape their strategy and tactics so as to maximise their access to (or control of) poppy-growing areas, or to areas receiving a significant amount of foreign aid. This may imply a weak relationship in the case of the poppy cultivation and the level of foreign aid variables.

The findings from this research need to be treated cautiously. Despite the efforts of organisations like the World Bank, data availability is limited, and the method used in the paper (pooled OLS) is not driven by what would be ideal in this case, but rather what the data permit.

A discussion of these problems is an important aim of this paper, through which we hope to contribute to further research on the subject.

Péter Marton is a Senior Assistant Professor and Research fellow at Corvinus University of Budapest. He holds PhD in multidisciplinary social sciences and is Vice-President of Corvinus Society for Foreign Affairs and Culture. Dr. Marton has worked for the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs. He specialises in foreign policy analysis and international relations theory, statebuilding, and international burden-sharing as well as NATO and Visegrad cooperation. He is co-author of *Statebuilding in Afghanistan*, London: Routledge (2012).

Balázs Szent-Iványi is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, which he joined in 2014. Previously, he worked at the Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency, and joined Corvinus University Budapest's Department of World Economy in 2007. Between 2012 and 2013, he was a Marie Curie Fellow at the University of Leeds. Dr. Balázs's main research interest is the political economy of foreign aid, with a particular focus on how foreign aid decisions are made in the emerging East Central European donor countries. He has advised the World Bank on its approach towards these new donors, as well as the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.





   
GHAZNI PRT
PRT COMMANDER CDR BRIAN OLAVIN PRT SENIOR ENLISTED LEADER SGTCS CHRIS FRIEDENRUCH